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Public opinion and political debate on immigration reform have focused
largely on two things: the impact of immigration on the economic well-being
of U.S. citizens, and the perception that immigrants are prone to crime.
According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center,
only about half (51%) of Americans believe that immigrants strengthen the U.S. economically through their
hard work and talents—down 6 percentage points from
last year—while a sizable minority (41%), including
a majority of Republicans (63%), say that immigrants
impose an economic burden by taking jobs, housing,
and health care resources.1 Views of the relationship
between immigration and crime are even more negative. A Gallup poll in 2007 asking whether immigration
makes the crime situation in the U.S. better, or worse,
or carries little effect, found that 58% of respondents
believed it makes crime worse.2 When business mogul
and Republican presidential contender Donald Trump,
in articulating his views on immigration, alleged that
Mexico is “sending” people to the U.S. “that have lots
of problems”—“they’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing
crime”—he was reflecting fears and mistrusts held my
many Americans.3 Not surprisingly, a poll taken earlier
this year showed that 73% of Americans want to see
Congress deal forcefully with the immigration issue by
passing a comprehensive immigration reform bill.4
It has been almost 30 years since the U.S. instituted comprehensive immigration legislation. In 1986,

SUMMARY
• Polls show a clear majority of Americans, concerned over issues such as crime and economic competition, wants to see
Congress pass a new, comprehensive immigration reform bill.
• This brief examines the effects, both intended and unintended,
of two previous efforts to deter and regulate unauthorized immigration.
• Recent research shows that the Immigration and Reform Act of
1986, by cutting off access to legal employment for undocumented immigrants, actually increases the probability that some
people who are not in the country legally will engage in crime.
• And despite heightened efforts to police and deport undocumented immigrants in accordance with Section 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, studies indicate that any resultant decreases in immigrant populations did nothing to improve
employment opportunities for low-skilled native residents.
• While past research reveals some of the limitations and unintended negative impacts of laws aimed at making the U.S.
less attractive to unauthorized immigrants, less is known about
the potential positive impacts of laws aimed at inclusion. Such
knowledge could help to enlighten future debates over comprehensive reform.
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Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA),
creating a pathway to legal status for
previously undocumented immigrants.
Any non-citizen that could document having entered the U.S. prior to
January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in the country since then, could
apply for amnesty and permanent
legal residency until May 4, 1988.
Non-citizens working in agriculture
were given a slightly longer amnesty
period, through November 30, 1988.
In all, IRCA enabled around 2.7
million people to gain legal resident
status. At the same time, however, to
help stem illegal immigration, IRCA
made new demands on employers by
instituting the I-9 verification process for new hires, making it illegal
for firms to knowingly hire or recruit
unauthorized immigrants. By cutting
off access to legal employment, IRCA
sought to discourage immigrants
that could not meet IRCA’s amnesty
requirements from staying in the
U.S., and deter new immigrants from
entering the county.
Ten years later, in 1996, Congress
acted again in passing the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).
A sprawling piece of legislation,
IIRIRA sought to strengthen bor-

der controls, tighten enforcement
against immigrant smuggling and
visa document fraud, establish new
rules for apprehending, detaining, and
deporting unauthorized immigrants,
and buttress the employment restrictions enacted under IRCA (e.g., it
introduced the E-Verify program).
One important innovation of IIRIRA
was the addition of Section 287(g)
to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized the federal
government to enter into agreements
with state and local law enforcement
agencies, allowing designated officers
at those agencies to enforce immigration law, under the supervision
of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). Although no
actions initially resulted from 287(g),
interest in that provision escalated
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, giving
rise to enforcement agreements with
Florida, Alabama, and several counties
in Southern California, among other
localities.5
Despite popular demands for
further action on immigration, recent
efforts to build on or modify current
legislation either have stalled (Senate bill S.744) or come under legal
dispute (President Obama’s executive order from November 2014). As
the nation tries to move forward on

this issue, it is important to consider
what lessons have been learned from
previous reform efforts. In particular,
have the enforcement policies enacted
under IRCA and 287(g) succeeded
in addressing the issues that are most
on the minds of Americans? Have
the employment restrictions and
broadened policing responsibilities
contributed to preventing crime and
improving economic opportunities for
native citizens?
Current research suggests not—
that U.S. immigration policy, in its
punitive approach to discouraging
immigration, has had little impact on
the economic lot of native workers,
and has created an environment that
actually invites certain types of criminal activity. The remainder of this brief
will summarize what the research
indicates, recommend areas for further
study, and offer guidelines for shaping
the ongoing discussion of immigration reform.

A PIVOTAL MOMENT—
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND
IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT
BEFORE AND AFTER IRCA
The implementation of IRCA offers
a unique window for studying U.S.
immigration policy. It provided new

NOTES
http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/04/broad-publicsupport-for-legal-status-for-undocumented-immigrants/.
2 http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1141175.
files/Waters-Simes.Politics%20of%20Immigration%20
and%20Crime.forthcoming%20chapter.pdf.
3 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/election-2016-donaldtrump-defends-calling-mexican-immigrants-rapists/.
4 http://fusion.net/story/47906/most-americans-wantrepublicans-to-focus-on-immigration-reform/.
5 To date, over 70 law enforcement agencies have entered
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into 287(g) agreements. 287(g) is now being phased out
across the country, but there is much to learn from the
results of past agreements.
6 Matthew Freedman, Emily Owens, and Sarah Bohn. 2015.
“Immigration, Employment Opportunities, and Criminal
Behavior.” Available at http://works.bepress.com/matthew_freedman/27.
7 Demographic and population research shows that immigrant neighborhoods tend to have higher poverty rates,
more residents per housing unit, more people of Mexican
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descent, a higher fraction of adults who speak Spanish at
home, and a higher fraction of foreign-born residents. In
Bexar County, nearly half of neighborhood residents in the
sample identified themselves as being of Mexican descent,
about 9% of residents were foreign-born, and 6% were
identified as non-citizens.
8 Sherrie Kossoudji and Deborah Cobb-Clark, “Coming out of
the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from
the Legalized Population,” Journal of Labor Economics 20
(2002): 598-628.
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national standards for immigrant
employment that differed significantly
from what existed prior to IRCA’s
implementation. It therefore gives
a means for assessing whether such
employment standards constituted an
effective policy tool for controlling
immigration flows and enhancing the
well-being of American communities.
IRCA, in practice, consisted of
two primary legalization programs: a
general program for Legally Authorized Workers (LAW ), which granted
legalization to 1.1 million immigrants
nationwide, and a program specific to
seasonal agricultural workers (SAW ),
which legalized an additional 1.6
million people. Most applications for
long-term residency were approved,
including 95.5% of all requests for
amnesty filed in Bexar County, Texas.
For University of Pennsylvania professor Emily Owens and her coauthors,
Matthew Freedman and Sarah Bohn,
the heavy flow of immigrants into that
county made it an ideal choice for
studying the behavior of immigrants
before and after IRCA.6
Immigration and Naturalization
Service records reveal that nearly
29,000 people in Bexar County, which
includes the city of San Antonio
and is about a two hour drive from
the Mexican border, applied for and

received permanent legal status under
IRCA—about 2.2 times the number of undocumented immigrants
estimated by the Census Bureau as
living in the county in 1986. To better
understand the relationship between
immigration and criminal activity, Owens and her coauthors used
administrative records from Bexar
County that detailed every felony
charge between 1980 and 1994. The
individual-level data identified both
the type of crime and the residence of
the alleged offender. They then relied
on comprehensive neighborhood
characteristics to identify Hispanics who were most likely recent
immigrants, in order to distinguish
them from the largely U.S.-born or
legalized Hispanic population of the
county.7
IRCA unquestionably improved
the labor market prospects of immigrants who applied for and were
granted amnesty between 1986 and
1988. Immigrants who chose not to
apply for amnesty, were rejected, or
came to the U.S. post-IRCA, found
fewer economic opportunities available to them, most likely due to the
threat of employment sanctions.
Without amnesty, immigrant wages
dropped as much as 24%, working
conditions deteriorated, and job search

durations rose.8
Such changes to the economic
prospects of unauthorized immigrants were predictable results of the
employment sanctions in IRCA, but
they also had clear, unintended consequences on the subsequent criminal
activity of residents in Bexar County.
Census data on inmates in prison
shows that foreign-born individuals are less likely than native-born
citizens to commit crimes overall. And
before the end of IRCA’s amnesty
period in 1988, Hispanics and nonHispanics committed roughly an equal
number of crimes annually in the
county. But the research by Owens,
Freedman, and Bohn finds evidence
that U.S. immigration policy established by IRCA actually increases the
probability that some people who are
not in the country legally will engage
in crime. When the IRCA amnesty
expired in 1988, and unauthorized
immigrants were cut off from legal
employment opportunities, alleged
felonies committed by Hispanics
rose 59% in the next few years [see
Figure 1]. Limiting job opportunities
through IRCA increased incidences
of crime, but in a very specific way.
Empirically, this rise was heavily concentrated in non-violent, felony drug
offenses and other income generating

NOTES
Census block groups were the official measure of neighborhoods used by Owens and her coauthors.
10 Emilio A. Parrado, “Immigration Enforcement Policies, the
Economic Recession, and the Size of Local Mexican Immigrant Populations,” The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 641 (2012): 16-37. Available at ann.sagepub.com/content/641/1/16.short.
11 Randy Capps, Marc R. Rosenblum, Cristina Rodriguez, and
Muzaffar Chishti, “Delegation and Divergence: A Study
of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement,”
9

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. [Note:
Many more deportations occurred outside of 287(g). For
instance, the American Community Survey reveals that
roughly 393,000 immigrant removals took place in 2009.]
12 Sarah Bohn and Robert Santillano. 2015. “Local Immigration Enforcement and Local Economies” (Unpublished
Working Paper, obtained from Bohn).
13 Parrado (2012).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/littleknown-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full
17 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/san-franciscomurder-case-exposes-lapses-in-immigration-enforcement.html?_r=0
16
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL NEIGHBORHOOD CRIMINAL INCIDENCE BY
ETHNICITY
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Crimes include all alleged felonies. Authors’ calculations based on Bexar County Court records.

crimes that effectively were substitutes
for formal employment—crimes like
prostitution, gambling, fraud, forgery,
car theft, burglary, robbery, and larceny. Income generating crime charges
were actually three times as likely to
be filed as non-income generating
crime charges across all Bexar County
neighborhoods.9
One complicating factor in
calculating the relationship between
IRCA and immigrant-specific crime
is the introduction at this time of new,
stricter anti-drug policies, as well as
the possibility that the police may
have started focusing more attention
on Hispanics after the expiration of
IRCA’s amnesty. But the analysis of
criminal conviction rates by Owens,
Freedman, and Bohn determined that
the uptick in felony charges was not
driven by changes in drug laws or
policing practices, but rather by the
new U.S. policy that reduced employment opportunities for immigrants
without legal status. Not only was

the rise in income generating criminal activity non-trivial, but tellingly,
the change in the crime rate among
immigrants was in line with other
economically high-risk groups, like
native residents living below the poverty line.

287(G)’S INABILITY TO CURB
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND
AFFECT THE SUPPLY OF
NATIVE JOBS
Just as IRCA provided a turning point
for evaluating the state of immigrant
life and the broad effects of reform,
so too do two key occurrences from
the end of the last decade allow for
a better understanding of immigration’s effects on native residents: the
economic crisis and the adoption of
287(g) agreements across the country.
A common motivation for stricter
immigration enforcement policies,
whether law enforcement partnership
agreements like 287(g) or enhanced
4

border security, stems from a prevalent, public belief that restricting
the inflow of immigrants, especially
those unauthorized to live and work
in the U.S., will increase employment
opportunities for low-skilled, native
residents who are looking for work.
But there are two issues with this
belief. First, it is not clear that policy
actions, even if desirable, actually have
the ability to affect population movements, as the decision to emigrate is
based largely on economic considerations. A second and related point
is this: in the face of an economic
downturn, immigration becomes a less
attractive proposition and the supply
of immigrants decreases naturally.10
The fact remains, however, that
287(g) did have some effect on local
foreign-born populations. By 2011,
the program had identified about
186,000 immigrants for deportation
and around 126,000 left the country
voluntarily.11 Therefore, understanding
the extent to which 287(g) impacted
the size of these populations and
increased native employment and
wages, if at all, may be instrumental in
informing and shaping immigration
enforcement policies in the future.
New research conducted by Sarah
Bohn and Rob Santillano looks at the
local economic impact of immigrant
removal through 287(g) by comparing
counties that participated in a 287(g)
agreement versus neighboring counties that did not.12 Using data from
Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages reports, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the National
Conference of State Legislatures,
Bohn and Santillano utilized what is
known as a difference-in-difference
approach—similar to what the
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researchers studying IRCA used—in
order to control for time-varying
local economic shocks. This approach
isolates the economic consequences of
implementing 287(g) and provides a
clearer assessment of 287(g)’s effects
on employment and wages than, for
instance, comparing 287(g) localities
with non-participating localities in
different regions of the country based
on population alone. These researchers found that compared to neighboring counties, wages in counties with
287(g) agreements did not uniformly
rise. In fact, wages in these localities
were lower in administrative services
(e.g., janitorial work) and slightly
lower in construction, although not in
other immigrant-heavy industries like
manufacturing or accommodation and
food services.
Additional findings, looking
specifically at immigration from
Mexico, confirm that 287(g) did not
have a substantial impact on aggregate
economic activity, and that there is no
evidence that the program improved
employment opportunities for native,
low-skilled residents or helped to
protect them from the negative effects
of the recession.13 Tellingly, there is
no indication of correlation between
changes in local foreign-born Mexican
populations and jobs in an industry
that was hit especially hard during the recession and that employed
many workers, undocumented and
native alike: construction [see Figure 2]. The implication here is that
native and foreign-born workers are
likely complements, not competitors,
because each group fills specialized
needs in respective industries.
Ultimately, 287(g) was effective at
removing unauthorized immigrants

only when applied forcefully, and in
some cases, enforcement measures
led to media and federal government
inquiries about alleged civil rights
violations and misappropriations of
law enforcement resources. Among
287(g) participating localities, the
largest reductions in foreign-born

effective at reversing the growth trend
of immigration into the United States.
Yet even the observed decreases in
foreign-born Mexican immigrants did
nothing to improve the employment
opportunities for low-skilled native
residents.14

FIGURE 2: LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN
WORKERS AND CONSTRUCTION JOBS, 2007-2009
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Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009.

populations were seen in Dallas, Los
Angeles, Riverside, and Phoenix.
Aside from these four, no other 287(g)
participating locality removed more
unauthorized immigrants between
2007 and 2009 than any one of several
so-called “sanctuary cities,” including New York, Chicago, Denver, and
San Francisco, which did not (by
definition) participate in 287(g). On
a national level, 287(g) had little to
no ability to control the outflow of
undocumented immigrants. The recession, on the other hand, proved quite
5

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
As Emily Owens has noted, while it
is not clear that policies like heightened policing or employer sanctions are effective at all in reducing
immigration, it is also unknown how
much loosening those restrictions
would increase immigration. The less
responsive immigration flows are to
U.S. policy, the more policymakers
should consider trying to reduce the
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negative social effects associated with
undocumented immigrants directly,
rather than waging a seemingly futile
battle to reduce the number of people
overstaying their visas or entering the
country illegally.
Given the lack of observed
economic benefits to native residents
from “attrition through enforcement”
policies, and their clear ineffectiveness at achieving desired immigration
flows, even when applied rigorously
for a sustained period of time, it is
probably unwise that policymakers have trended in this direction,
as evident in recent state laws like
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Alabama’s
H.B. 56, as well as the federally initiated Secure Communities program of
2008, which is a deportation program
similar to 287(g). Part of this push
for stricter enforcement and deportation has involved a renewed call to
eliminate “sanctuary cities” and other
areas that do not actively seek to
identify and remove undocumented
immigrants. However, the revitalized
neighborhoods and small businesses
formed and aided by immigrants
have led many local governments in
the country to resist such calls. Some
states (i.e., Illinois, Massachusetts,
and New York) have even attempted,
unsuccessfully, to withdraw from the
Secure Communities program.15
These disagreements between different
regions of the country illustrate just
how divided government officials are

in their understanding of the economic impact of immigration.
Another example of an “attrition
through enforcement” program of
questionable merit is the so-called
“detention bed mandate.” In late 2013,
NPR reported on a Congressional
mandate issued to ICE that required
the agency to fill “34,000 beds in some
250 facilities across the country, per
day, with immigrant detainees.”16
This program began in 2009 and costs
taxpayers an estimated $2 billion
annually. Immigrants in these facilities
can be made to stay for as little as one
day or for as long as a few years, again
beckoning questions about potential
civil rights violations. But in short,
the practice of enforcing an arbitrary
inmate quota likely has an insignificant effect, given the results noted
above, on decreasing crime or improving native employment.
Moving forward, as the immigration debate continues, one of the chief
roadblocks in studying illegal immigration will be the continued decentralized nature of social data collection in the U.S., especially compared
to Europe, and particularly when it
comes to criminal justice issues. This
fact was on clear display recently in
the case of the undocumented immigrant with prior criminal convictions
who shot and killed a woman in San
Francisco.17 In the U.S., the best
research is on tightening immigration reforms, but there is less research

6

being done on how efforts to actively
incorporate undocumented immigrants into society (e.g., sanctuary
city ordinances, local IDs and drivers
licenses, and in-state school tuition for
child arrivals) affect criminal behavior
and economic outcomes for natives,
such as wages and employment. In
other words, while past research has
revealed insights about the potential unintended negative impacts of
laws aimed at making the U.S. a less
attractive place to live, less is known
about the potential unintended positive impacts of laws aimed at inclusion. This knowledge could help to
enlighten future debates over comprehensive reform.

CONCLUSION
Perceptions of how illegal immigration affects native residents have
shaped policies, but these policies are
potentially ineffective both in general
(i.e., at stopping the tide of undocumented immigrants from entering the
country, as well as at deporting them)
and in their specific focuses, like in
lowering crime and improving native
employment. Policymakers should
consider objectively the effects of past
policies such as IRCA and 287(g),
before instituting new, non-data
driven mandates and legislation in
response to public demand.
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